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



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Titelmotiv

Historische Darstellung des Systems von Befestigungswerken zwischen Usedom und der Südostküste Rügens, die der Sperrung der Zufahrt nach Stralsund dienen, 1715.

*Aus: Th. Förster,
Die strategische Lage der Insel Rügen in
Verbindung mit Stralsund und dem
Hinterland, Abb. 8.*

Caesarea Maritima and the Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire

Gil Gambash

Abstract – *Caesarea Maritima has been considered an essential part of the grand plan allegedly conceived by the Roman Empire for the Mediterranean. The massive artificial harbour built there between the years 25-13 BCE has been seen as an especially designed point d'appui for Roman troops in the ongoing struggle with the Parthian Empire. The very foundation and development of Caesarea has been conjectured to have involved deliberate planning by the central imperial government in Rome. Still more far-reaching hypotheses attribute part of the reason for the construction of Caesarea's harbour to the vulnerability and decreasing efficiency of Antioch on the Orontes, more than 200 miles to the north. Finally, Caesarea was assigned an obvious place on the map of major ports which supported the traffic of the great grain clippers, supposedly sailing under the organization of the Annona at Rome. This article aims to take issue with these and similar conjectures. The focus currently laid on a widely unsubstantiated notion of a Roman grand strategy at work should shift to a series of local factors playing in the background of Caesarea's foundation, employment, and maintenance as a large artificial harbour. A picture of wide disregard of the harbour, both by the central Roman government and by troops operating in the region, would suggest that it may hardly be ascribed a significant role in the logistics of the Roman Empire.*

Inhalt – *Caesarea Maritima ist als ein wesentlicher Teil eines großen, angeblich vom Römischen Reich für das Mittelmeer entworfenen Plans angesehen worden. Der hier 25-13 v. Chr. gebaute riesige künstliche Hafen wurde als eigens geplanter Stützpunkt für römische Truppen im ständigen Kampf mit dem Partherreich betrachtet. Gründung und Entwicklung Caesareas selbst gingen, wie man annahm, auf bewusste Planung der zentralen kaiserlichen Verwaltung in Rom zurück. Noch weiter gehende Hypothesen geben als Teil des Grundes für den Bau des Hafens von Caesarea die Verwundbarkeit und sinkende Tauglichkeit des 200 Meilen nördlich gelegenen Antiochia am Orontes an. Schließlich wurde Caesarea als gegebener Ort unter den wichtigeren Häfen betrachtet, die den Verkehr der großen, vermutlich unter der Verwaltung der Annona in Rom segelnden Kornfrachter stützten.*

Dieser Beitrag behandelt diese und ähnliche Vermutungen. Der Schwerpunkt, der zur Zeit auf einer weitgehend unbegründeten Vorstellung von einer großen römischen Strategie liegt, sollte auf eine Reihe örtlicher Faktoren verlegt werden, die im Hintergrund der Gründung, Verwendung und Unterhaltung Caesareas als eines großen künstlichen Hafens mitspielen. Das Bild weitgehender Nichtbeachtung des Hafens seitens sowohl der römischen Zentralregierung als auch der in der Region operierenden Truppen läßt eher darauf schließen, dass ihm kaum eine wichtige Rolle in der Logistik des Römischen Reiches zuzuweisen ist.

The field of maritime history in the Mediterranean naturally bears on the discussion of the grand strategy of ancient empires in the region, but has yet to be investigated from such a perspective. Sparked by the American strategist Edward Luttwak in 1976, the debate is still very much alive as to whether such a thing as a grand strategy ever existed in the ancient world¹. The nature of the discussion and the main features of its development are sufficiently well known and do not require detailed exposition here. Suffice to say that Luttwak and his later supporters recognised in the Roman world a transformation in

imperial frontiers, from little-defined zones in the 1st century, into fixed boundary-lines in the 2nd century, distinct and set to follow natural barriers such as rivers and mountain-chains, and supplemented, where required, with lines of close fortifications. This rigid system, according to the hypothesis, had to adjust itself to a more flexible strategy of defense in depth, designed in the 3rd century to meet the intensifying threat of foreign invasions. It should be noted that, while Luttwak chose for his book the title of „The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire“, his actual sphere of investigation was only

the frontiers of the Roman empire. Yet, once started, the debate did not limit itself to the issue of frontiers, nor, for that matter, to the Roman empire alone, as scholars began to examine the motivation and capability of ancient imperial administrations more generally to formulate, apply, and adhere to such an intricate scheme as a grand strategy².

The discussion soon took a decisive turn against the notion that a grand strategy could have existed in antiquity³. Most scholars would accept a definition of grand strategy as *the constant and intelligent*

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*reassessment of the polity's ends and means*⁴. An outspoken critic of Luttwak, C.R. Whittaker enumerates a whole series of factors which, in his view, are required to be implicated in the evaluation of a grand strategy, and which are largely not present in developed form in the ancient world: the posting and movement of legions; the efficient use of manpower; central military inventories; muster roles and orders of battle; information services such as maps, strategic reports, etc.; support services; logistical organization; officers and committees for supply and planning; the construction of roads, colonies, alliances; planning; appreciation of the different roles of diplomacy; policing and military action, and the need for defense in depth; finally, a central decision-making process; rational objectives of war; discrimination between wars of survival and wars of glory⁵.

This itemization does not refer directly to the maritime sphere; yet it includes various elements – concerning support services, logistical organization, transportation arrangements, and the central orchestration of such projects – which make obvious the room that must be made on such a list also for state-controlled fleets, harbours, and maritime routes. Essentially, if there existed no grand strategy in the running of ancient Mediterranean empires, there could exist no well-planned, centrally-controlled background for the building and maintenance of fleets and artificial harbours.

In the specialised field of maritime history, a picture prevails – a good few decades after the emergence of Luttwak's hypothesis – of grand strategy at work. Not necessarily consciously, research of maritime activity often assumes the existence of a central government constantly and intelligently reassessing ends and means to that effect. The phenomenon pervades most major aspects of the field, from the study of maritime trade and the various means serving it, to that of military naval forces and the way in which

they were built, maintained, and employed⁶.

Rome's dependence on the *Annona*, for example, has long been noticed by historians, who rightly emphasise the dedication demonstrated by the emperors of the Principate to supplying the citizens of the City with subsidised rations of cereals on a regular basis. Nevertheless, whether or not a deliberate system existed that was responsible for answering this particular need of Rome should remain a debatable issue. There is much speculation in ascribing to the various channels supplying grain to Rome pan-Mediterranean organization, long-term central planning, and the allocation of considerable state resources, all believed to have underlain the activity of large commercial fleets, operating great freighters along well-secured shipping routes⁷. Several aspects of the grain trade throw disturbing light on such hypotheses. Frequent grain shortages in Rome, for example, highlight fragility in the system, in so far as one existed, and demonstrate the extent to which Rome depended on spontaneity and improvisation in the face of sudden obstacles – be they caused by the activity of pirates; by civil wars; or by poor harvests in the main Mediterranean grain basins, notably Egypt and Sicily.

Caesarea Maritima has been ascribed a significant role in the grand plan allegedly conceived by the Roman Empire for the Mediterranean⁸. The massive artificial harbour built there between the years 22-10/9 BCE was named by Herod, its founder, as Sebastos. It is often treated by scholars, directly or implicitly, as a token of a central plan, elaborate and forward-looking, whose purpose it was to maximise Rome's control over its dominions. Much has been made of Herod's relationship with Augustus himself, and with one of the persons closest to him, M. Vipsanius Agrippa. The fact that the building of Sebastos took full advantage of the most advanced technologies known to the Roman world at the

time has been used to link Herod's architectural ambitions with those witnessed in Rome itself⁹. Above all, the initial plan of the city of Caesarea, with its temple dedicated to Roma and to Augustus, its theater and amphitheater, and its promontory palace, shows affinity to the program building carried out in the city of Rome contemporarily by Agrippa and Augustus¹⁰. And the instructions given by Vitruvius for the building of an artificial harbour were found by archaeologists to have been followed to the letter by Herod's engineers, including the usage of pozzolana from the Puteoli region – Vitruvius' first recommendation for the preparation of effective hydraulic concrete¹¹.

These characteristics of the Herodian projects in Caesarea could have been used, in and of themselves, to point out the king's knowledge of the culture and technology of the Roman world, and to demonstrate his willingness to participate in the practice, widely prevailing in the Roman provincial system, of adopting and promoting the various attributes of the Roman propaganda of power¹². But, put together with Herod's several meetings with Augustus and Agrippa, they have also been used persistently to suggest the existence of a direct interest of the Princeps and his leading lieutenant in the building of a great artificial harbour in the eastern part of the Mediterranean¹³. The hypothesis suggesting that the central Roman government was directly involved in the commissioning and planning of a Mediterranean harbour outside of Italy goes hand in hand with the assumption that a number of crucial Roman interests could benefit from the existence of such a harbour. What we are made to believe is that, standing in Rome beside a sand-table representing the Mediterranean region, the Augustan administration, and the ones following it, perhaps as late as through the Byzantine period, was engaged in the constant and intelligent reassessment of the Empire's ends and means.

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The topic of the deployment of troops, for example, features predominantly in such discussions. According to the hypothesis, Rome's military demands in the area of the southern Levant would have been served by the foundation of a large artificial harbour in Caesarea¹⁴. Judaea alone demanded a hefty amount of attention during the 1st and 2nd centuries; and the tension between Rome and the Parthian empire to the East, a serious issue during Augustus' time, required considerable efforts from the Roman administration and army. But can these problems supply the reason for the building of Sebastos?

The representation of large artificial harbours as places fit for hosting large war-fleets should be approached with caution, and it may well be that the similarity of Sebastos to the Athenian Piraeus, pointed out by Josephus, ends with the size of the two harbours¹⁵. Since the time of the Achaemenid empire, most large war-fleets in the Mediterranean were assembled from various allies and vassal-states of the central power for ad-hoc purposes, and were dismantled shortly upon the conclusion of the campaign¹⁶. Transporting troops did not require permanent anchoring facilities, and warships themselves, even the large triremes, would have been beached on appropriate shores whenever in the field and required to await further developments¹⁷. This was done primarily in order to preserve the ships' timber, a purpose which also dictated the construction of ship-sheds in the home-base of war-fleets.

Despite extensive efforts to identify them, no ship-sheds were found in Caesarea, and, to be sure, what with the extensive program of public building just next to the sea-shore, not much room would have been left available for beaching even a small-sized fleet¹⁸. The transportation of troops hardly would have benefited from the facilities offered by Sebastos, seeing that such an operation would have consisted of a brief, one-time action, conceived ad hoc, and easily obtainable by

means of barges, or by using smaller harbours in the area – such as Joppa, some 50 km to the south, and, notably, Dora, only 10 km to the north.

While this is all circumstantial evidence, the Romans' actions state much more clearly their preferences. First and foremost, it must be remembered that the Roman administration did not find it necessary to station a legion in the southern Levant until after the great Jewish revolt, which concluded in the year 70; this, while keeping four legions in Syria. Furthermore, after Herod's death, whenever Judaea, Galilee, and Samaria showed signs of unrest, the Roman governors of the province of Syria preferred to march on foot along the *Via maris*, and never made use of the harbour at Caesarea, allegedly ideally located and facilitated for exactly such purposes. Publius Varus in 4 BCE and Cestius Gallus in 66 came to Judaea in order to subjugate local revolts¹⁹. Varus brought with him two legions – a third had earlier been sent by him to Jerusalem; and this force was supplemented by *whatever allied forces kings or tetrarchs could provide*. Taking his time before launching his own campaign, Cestius Gallus marched at the head of a larger force – just short of thirty thousand men: *Legio XII Fulminata*, two thousand men from each of the other three Syrian legions; six *cohortes* of infantry, four *alae* of cavalry, and some thirteen thousand royal forces.

Above all, it is a telling fact that Vespasian and Titus, when gathering their troops early in 67 towards their campaign against the Jewish Revolt, preferred to take for their point d'appui Akko Ptolemais and not Caesarea Maritima²⁰. The Phoenician harbour at Akko, it will be remembered, was probably built during the early Hellenistic period, and would have been too small to accommodate simultaneously a great number of vessels. On the other hand, the bay of Akko was famous in antiquity for its sandy shores, as was noted by Josephus

and Strabo²¹. Three legions constituted the core of Vespasian's force, only one of which, the *X Fretensis*, was taken from Syria's regular garrison²². This meant, incidentally, that three legions remained in Syria under the charge of Syria's recently appointed legate, Mucianus. Vespasian's legionary forces were supplemented by twenty-three auxiliary *cohortes*, and six *alae* of cavalry. In addition, some eighteen thousand troops were sent by four client kings – Antiochus IV of Commagene, Agrippa II, Sohaemus of Emesa, and Malchus II of Nabataea.

The mammoth army amounted to some 60.000 troops, as large as the one assembled for the invasion of Britain in the year 43²³. It was not until all of this force was deployed in the region and engaged in activity against the rebels that Caesarea was recruited to the effort, at first as a base for hibernation, then as the headquarters of Vespasian²⁴. It would have been Caesarea's superior location for the purpose of running operations in Judaea and Jerusalem that would have made it preferable to Akko. And, of course, it had served as the capital of the local Roman administration for decades prior to the revolt, thus making it ideally facilitated for Vespasian's purposes. Still, throughout his long sojourn in the area, until the year 70, it is impossible to find an occasion where Sebastos – the harbour itself – came to play any significant role in this massive campaign.

Another major theme in the narrative of Caesarea as a characteristic feature in the grand strategy of the Roman Empire relates to the commercial capacities of Sebastos. The harbours of the East, it is usually assumed, were an essential part in the intricate trade network that supplied the city of Rome with many of the commodities on which it had grown accustomed to rely, such as ivory from south of the Sahara; pepper from India; incense from south Arabia; and silk from China²⁵. The existence of a strong demand for such and other

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eastern goods in the Roman world is beyond doubt, and must be imagined as the very spark and fuel of the process. While independent Mediterranean networks took it upon themselves to supply widely acknowledged demands, Rome need not have occupied itself with the mechanics of the process. Several further issues should be heeded if a direct link is to be drawn between the Roman market needs and the building of a harbour such as Sebastos.

Notably, the study of the topic of maritime activity in the ancient Mediterranean has recently witnessed a significant shift in focus – from large freighters, carrying high-value commodities from one major port to another along sea-crossing routes; to smaller vessels, operating locally, mostly along the coast, while servicing trade activity which consisted in elementary goods²⁶. Additionally, coastal seafaring – termed in professional literature also as *cabotage* – gradually reveals itself to have been omnipresent, and to have functioned continuously, regardless of shifting circumstances. Indeed, forces of sea-bound connectivity in antiquity are now believed to have been strong enough to overcome geographical barriers and unfavorable natural conditions; as well as to cross boundary lines once thought impenetrable – be it of cultural, political, or religious nature²⁷. For the caboteur, a harbour such as Sebastos would have been redundant, seeing that he could improvise on much more immediate basis as the need arose, for example to take shelter from bad weather.

To this must be added the fact, curious in itself, that the Herodian layers in Caesarea offer very little evidence insofar as regards functional storage spaces in the vicinity of the harbour. It was Netzer who pointed out, not only that storehouses are altogether missing from the Herodian shoreline, but that there would have been very little space for them anyway, what with the elaborate public building

which took over a great number of appropriately located *insulae*²⁸. On top of that, it remains true that we lack data relating to direct traffic links between the city and the harbour; and to the general location of commercially based facilities²⁹.

There remains the issue of the large freighters, known to have served the grain demands of Rome on the line between Alexandria and Italy. I have pointed out some of the problems in ascribing central planning to the institution of the *Annona*. Here too market forces of demand can be seen as the main motivators behind the significant efforts witnessed all around the Mediterranean to bring grain in sufficient amount to Rome. The proponents of a grand strategic organization of the *Annona* assume, however, that the central government – Augustus and Agrippa themselves, in our case – was involved in facilitating the grain flow³⁰. The harbour at Caesarea, according to this hypothesis, was conceived and built in order to supply another stop on the way from Alexandria to Syria, notorious for its lack of harbours and natural havens.

The question to be asked here is to what extent the grain freighters, which often took sea-crossing routes, actually required frequent stops, or at least immediate possibilities for security, in the case of bad weather. In a text often overlooked, although it offers a rare description of one such freighter, Lucian of Samosata offers revealing details regarding the route preferred by one of the only skippers known to us. In the dialogue, a group of Athenian friends encounter the great grain clipper *ISIS*, which, on its way from Alexandria to Rome, encountered bad weather, and finally ended at the Piraeus. Before losing its course, it is stated in the dialogue, the ship initially made it, with a moderate wind, from Alexandria to Cyprus – to Akamas, the cape at the northwest extremity of the island³¹:

I had it from the captain himself, a nice fellow and good to talk to. He

said the wind was moderate when they left from Pharos, and they sighted Akamas on the seventh day. Then a west wind blew against them, and they were carried as far east as Sidon [...]. Having lost their proper course, they sailed across the Aegean, bearing up against the Etesian winds, and they anchored in Piraeus yesterday, seventy days after leaving Egypt, having drifted that far downwind. If they had kept Crete on their right, they would have doubled Malea, and been in Italy by now.

The journey, then, lasted seven days, and this amount of time indicates beyond doubt that the ship sailed on a direct course, through the open sea, and not, as is usually assumed for ships leaving Alexandria, along the shores of the Levant. Calculations suggest that the direct route to Cyprus would have taken five days at the minimum; whereas sailing along the Levantine coast would have lasted no less than two weeks, and that while sailing also during nighttime³². The reality described in Lucian's dialogue, written around the year 150, may be seen to represent the 1st and 2nd centuries CE, when the traffic of the grain freighters was at its height. It is hard to imagine what role the harbour of Caesarea would have played in such a routine, which, 'cut the corner' – so to speak – of the entire eastern Mediterranean coast in favour of a shorter, faster route to Rome.

The written corpus is hardly helpful in suggesting otherwise, as it mostly mentions the harbour of Caesarea in the context of human transportation³³. To be sure, Saint Paul, Saint Peter, Josephus, and even Herod himself, could have found answer to their travel needs in a smaller harbour. Thus, the picture presented so far demonstrates how frail is the link that may be drawn between Rome and Caesarea, and what little contribution the harbour of Sebastos, massive and modern as it was, would have had to offer to Rome's strategic and economic interests in the region. The impression is enhanced when

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we turn, finally, to gauge the amount and nature of central imperial attention turned to the harbour as such.

Coins supply a useful medium through which we may observe the significance – practical and symbolic – of a given site. To be sure, so long as Caesarea remained in Herodian hands, coins minted by its rulers enhanced to the extreme the central role of the harbour in the routine of the city. The importance of the harbour is epitomised in the legend on a coin minted by King Agrippa I (43-4 CE), reading: ΚΑΙΣΑΡΕΙΑ Η ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟ ΣΕΒΑΣΤΟΛΙΜΕΝΙ (Caesarea which is near the harbour of Sebastos)³⁴. Once the city came under direct Roman rule, however, the maritime motifs disappeared almost completely from relevant coins minted by both emperors and the local procurators³⁵. In all the many coins minted by the province's prefects and procurators in the city between the years 6 (when Judaea was provincialised) and 66 (when the great revolt broke out) not a single maritime motif can be found. And of the 24 emperors known to have issued coins in Caesarea, only Nero is known to have had a rudder and an anchor on his coins (67-68 CE); and only Trajan Decius put the image of a ship on the reverse of a coin in the year 243 CE³⁶.

Even more telling is the archaeology of the harbour itself. Had Caesarea played a significant part in the Roman scheme for controlling its empire and the Mediterranean networks that served its economy, one would have expected to witness active involvement of the central government in the maintenance of the harbour, particularly once the local client kings were deposed and the Roman administration assumed direct control over the province. Archaeologists are, however, unanimous in recognizing an all-round neglect and deterioration, probably starting in 6 CE with the death of Archelaus, Herod's son, and showing its signs soon thereafter. Hohlfelder thus recognises the decline of the harbour's outer

basin by the end of the 1st century³⁷. And Raban points out the siltation of the inner basin by the end of the 2nd century³⁸. Underwater excavations and the discovery of wrecks inside the harbour indicate that the outer breakwaters lost their integrity before the mid-3rd century, perhaps as a result of a strong surge from the open sea³⁹.

During this period, and in decades and centuries to come, the deterioration in the condition of the town's port-facilities was met with no response by the government in Rome, to the effect that the harbour soon ceased to be functional to vessels of larger size⁴⁰. By the 4th century, the external, deeper part of the harbour – originally imagined to have served the great grain clippers – was already in ruins and out of function⁴¹. At the turn of the 6th century CE, the praise directed by Procopius of Gaza to the emperor Anastasius for repairing the harbour is noteworthy, not only on account of the late timing with which Caesarea ultimately returned to at least partial functionality, but also because of the distinct context of imperial munificence in which this repair was obviously carried out:

The port of the city named after Caesar had fallen into bad condition in the course of time and became exposed to the waves, no longer deserving in fact to be titled a port but preserving merely its name from its former fortune. But you (Anastasius) did not ignore the city's prayers and laments over the ships which, escaping the sea, were wrecked in the harbour itself. [...] Thanks to your decision the city was rejuvenated and receives ships without fear and is provided for its basic requirements⁴².

Herod's harbour city, like many of his other projects, while impressive on an imperial scale, remained functional mostly in the local context. Archaeologists of the harbour have long recognised the fact that the size of the harbour and its sophistication far exceeded local abilities to maintain it after Herod's

death. It may very well be the case that, even during Herod's day, these same characteristics of the harbour – namely its size and sophistication – went far beyond actual needs – both regional and local.

Notes

¹ Luttwak, E.N. 1976: *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire from the First Century A.D. to the Third* (Baltimore). For support of the hypothesis see for example Ferrill, A. 1991: *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire*, in: Kennedy, P. (ed.): *Grand Strategy in War and Peace* (New Haven) 71-85; Mattern, S.P. 1999: *Rome and the Enemy: Imperial Strategy in the Principate* (Berkeley). For a thorough survey of the debate and its development see Whittaker, C.R. 2004: *Rome and its Frontiers: the Dynamics of Empire* (London) chapter 2.

² See for example the discussion on Achaemenid Persia: Harrison, T. 2010: *Writing Ancient Persia* (London/New York) 44-47.

³ Millar, F. 1982: *Emperors, Frontiers and Foreign Relations, 31 BC - AD 378*, *Britannia* 13, 1-23; Isaac, B.H. 1990: *The Limits of Empire: the Roman Army in the East* (Oxford); Whittaker, C.R. 1994: *Frontiers of the Roman Empire: a Social and Economic Study* (Baltimore/London).

⁴ Kennedy 1991 (see note 1) 6.

⁵ Whittaker 2004 (see note 1).

⁶ E.g. Pryor, J.H. 1987: *Commerce, Shipping, and Naval Warfare in the Medieval Mediterranean* (London).

⁷ Casson, L. 1991: *The Ancient Mariners: Seafarers and Sea Fighters of the Mediterranean in Ancient Times* (Princeton) 206-239.

⁸ For discussion see e.g. Beebe, H.K. 1984: *Caesarea Maritima: its Strategic and Political Significance to Rome*, *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 42/3, 195-207; Rickman, G.E. 1985: *Towards a Study of Roman Ports*, in: Raban, A. (ed.), *Harbour Archaeology* (Oxford) 105-114; Raban, A. 2009: *The Harbour of Sebastos (Caesarea Maritima) in its Roman Mediterranean Context* (Oxford) 1-13.

⁹ Hohlfelder, R.L. 1988: Procopius, *De Aedificiis* 1.11.18-20: *Caesarea Maritima and the Building of Harbours in Late Anti-*

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- ¹⁰ Gleason, K.L. 1996: *Ruler and Spectacle: The Promontory Palace*, in: Raban – Holum (see note 9) 208-227.
- ¹¹ Vitruv, *De architectura* 5.12.
- ¹² For the general topic see Ando, C. 2000: *Imperial Ideology and Provincial Loyalty in the Roman Empire* (Berkeley). For *Caesarea* see e.g. Hohlfelder 1988 (note 9); Fischer, M. 1996: *Marble, Urbanism, and Ideology in Roman Palestine: The Caesarea Example*, in: Raban – Holum 1996 (note 9) 251-261.
- ¹³ Hohlfelder 1988 (note 9); Gleason 1996 (note 10).
- ¹⁴ Beebe 1984 (note 8).
- ¹⁵ For the historian's full description of the harbour, see Josephus, *Antiquitates Judaicae* 15.9.6.
- ¹⁶ Gambash, G. (forthcoming): *En Route to Egypt – Akko in the Persian Period*, *Journal of Near Eastern Studies*.
- ¹⁷ See e.g. Thucyd. 6.66; 7.12.3-4; 8.11.
- ¹⁸ Raban 2009 (note 8) 54-57.
- ¹⁹ Most recently Gambash, G. 2013: *Foreign Enemies of the Empire: The Great Jewish Revolt and the Roman Perception of the Jews*, *Scripta Classica Israelica* 32, 173-194.
- ²⁰ Josephus, *Bellum Judaicum* (= *BJ*) 3.2.4.
- ²¹ Strabo speaks generally of the sandy beach between Akko and Tyre (Strab. 16.2.25). Josephus (*BJ* 2.10.2) is more explicit in his description of Akko's sandy beaches, constantly replenished by the winds.
- ²² The other two legions were the *XV Apollinaris*, brought by Titus from Alexandria, and the *V Macedonica*, which participated in the Armenian campaign in 61/62. See Gambash 2013 (note 19).
- ²³ Millar, F. 1993: *The Roman Near East, 31 BC - AD 337* (Cambridge, MA/London) 72; Millar, F. 2005: *Last Year in Jerusalem: Monuments of the Jewish War in Rome*, in: Edmondson, J. – Mason, S. – Rives, J.B. (eds.), *Flavius Josephus and Flavian Rome* (Oxford) 101.
- ²⁴ For *Caesarea* as a resting place for the troops see Joseph. *BJ* 3.409; and as *Vespasian's* headquarter: Joseph. *BJ* 4.491.
- ²⁵ Beebe 1984 (note 8).
- ²⁶ *Geniza* documents have been famously shown by Goitein to disprove notions of a Muslim-Christian divide across the Mediterranean, as previously perceived by Pirenne: Goitein, S.D. 1967-1993: *A Mediterranean Society: The Jewish Communities of the Arab World as Portrayed in the Documents of the Cairo Geniza* (Berkeley/Los Angeles); Pirenne, E. 1937: *Mahomet et Charlemagne* (Paris). Theories of connectivity have reached their culmination with the publication of Horden, P. – Purcell N. 2000: *The Corrupting Sea: A Study of Mediterranean History* (Malden, MA) 123-172.
- ²⁷ *Ibid.* For a local example see Gambash, G. (forthcoming 2014): *Maritime Activity in the Ancient Southern Levant: The Case of Late Antique Dor*, *ARAM* 25.
- ²⁸ Netzer, E. 2006: *The Architecture of Herod the Great Builder* (Tübingen) 101.
- ²⁹ *Ibid.* 285.
- ³⁰ Beebe 1984 (note 8).
- ³¹ Lucian of Samosata, *The Ship, or The Wishes*, 7-9.
- ³² The calculations are based on ORBIS: The Stanford Geospatial Network Model of the Roman World (<http://orbis.stanford.edu/#>).
- ³³ Raban, A. 1992: *Kaisaria H Pros To Sebasto Limeni: Two Harbours for Two Entities?*, in: Vann, R.L. (ed.), *Caesarea Papers I* (Ann Arbor) 69; Raban, A. 1992: *Sebastos: The Royal Harbour at Caesarea Maritima – A Short-Lived Giant*, *Internat. Journal of Nautical Archaeology* 21.2, 111-124.
- ³⁴ Meshorer, Y. 1967: *Jewish Coins of the Second Temple Period* (Tel Aviv) 139, n. 90.
- ³⁵ Ringel, J. 1988: *Literary Sources and Numismatic Evidence of Maritime Activity in Caesarea during the Roman Period*, in: Malkin, I. – Hohlfelder, R.L. (eds.), *Mediterranean Cities: Historical Perspectives* (London) 63-73.
- ³⁶ Kadman, L. 1957: *The Coins of Caesarea Maritima* (Tel Aviv/Jerusalem) 85-86, nos. 8-9, pl. 7-8.
- ³⁷ Hohlfelder, R. 1992: *The Changing Fortunes of Caesarea's Harbours in the Roman Period*, in: Vann (see note 33) 75-78.
- ³⁸ Raban, Sebastos (see note 33); Raban, A. 1996, *The Inner Harbor Basin of Caesarea: Archaeological Evidence for its Gradual Demise*, in: Raban – Holum 1996 (see note 9) 628-666.
- ³⁹ Raban, A. 1985: *Caesarea Maritima 1983-1984*, *Internat. Journal of Nautical Archaeology* 14.2, 158.
- ⁴⁰ Raban, in Vann (see note 33) dates this development to 70, on account of the city's changed status into that of a colony. In fact, the date could be much earlier, soon after the removal of the Herodian family, and the provincialization of Judaea in 6 CE.
- ⁴¹ Hohlfelder 1992 (see note 37).
- ⁴² Procopius Gazaeus, *Panegyricus in Imperatorem Anastasium* 19.

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