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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NAVAL TRIUMPH IN ROMAN HISTORY  
(260–29 BCE)

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## THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NAVAL TRIUMPH IN ROMAN HISTORY (260–29 BCE)\*

### 1. Introduction

According to Roman tradition the first naval triumph was celebrated by C. Duilius as consul in 260.<sup>1</sup> Between the triumph of Duilius and that of Cn. Octavius (*pr.* 168, *cos.* 165) in 167 the extant *Fasti* record some eleven triumphs as having been celebrated specifically on account of naval victories. Although the Roman triumph has attracted much attention in recent scholarship and modern approaches have been markedly diverse, this impressive series of naval triumphs has received disproportionately little scholarly scrutiny.<sup>2</sup> Mary Beard, for example, mentions only three celebrations of naval triumphs in her *magnum opus* on the subject and the naval triumph is only discussed in passing.<sup>3</sup> Christa Steinby's recent study on the Republican navy likewise disregards naval triumphs, apart from the mere observation that such celebrations did occur.<sup>4</sup> The lack of modern scholarly attention warrants a detailed survey of these triumphs.

This study endeavours to demonstrate three intertwined points. First, it will be suggested that the chronological distribution of the naval triumphs supports the assertions of Polybius and other ancient sources that the Romans only undertook serious naval combat from the First Punic War. The second aim is to show that such triumphs defined as 'naval' were part and parcel of the traditional Roman triumphal ritual, regardless of this remarkable, though not fortuitous, chronological concentration. As a complement to this line of inquiry, this paper will also address whether the naval triumph differed from the traditional public triumph in terms of either the preconditions for its award or the nature of the actual celebration.<sup>5</sup> Finally, as an epilogue, this study will discuss two examples of considerable naval victories from the first century BCE that do not appear from the *Fasti* to have been celebrated as naval triumphs, and suggest that Octavianus' Actian triumph of August 29 was the last official naval triumph in Roman history.

### 2. Polybius and the early Roman navy

Polybius cites as one reason for writing his *Histories* that he wanted to explain how, when and for what reasons the Romans had first taken to the sea.<sup>6</sup> He then recounts how the Romans allegedly used a captured Carthaginian vessel as a model for the construction of a war fleet. How to equate Polybius' statements with sporadic evidence of maritime activity prior to the First Punic War has been the subject of much modern

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\* All dates are BCE unless otherwise indicated. We would like to thank Professor Werner Eck for making a series of valuable comments and incisive suggestions and assume all responsibility for any remaining flaws or errors.

<sup>1</sup> This celebration is explicitly defined as the first such triumph in both the literary sources and the *Fasti Triumphales*. Livy *Per.* 17 is very clear: *primusque omnium Romanorum duces naualis uictoriae duxit triumphum*; see also Cic. *Sen.* 13 (44), Val. Max. 3.6.4, Plin. *N.H.* 34.20, Tac. *Ann.* 2.49, Flor. 1.18, and Sil. It. *Pun.* 6.663–669.

<sup>2</sup> In particular, T. Itgenshorst, *Tota illa pompa: Der Triumph in der römischen Republik*, Göttingen 2005, M. Beard, *The Roman Triumph*, Cambridge 2007, and M. R. Pelikan Pittenger, *Contested Triumphs. Politics, Pageantry and Performance in Livy's Republican Rome*, Berkeley 2008.

<sup>3</sup> Beard (n. 2) briefly discusses the examples of Duilius (p. 63), Catulus and Falto (p. 210f.), and Octavius (pp. 118 and 164).

<sup>4</sup> C. Steinby, *The Roman Republican Navy: From the Sixth Century to 167 B.C.*, Helsinki 2007. Statements that a naval triumph was celebrated are the only references in the work. The significance of the institution or the potential implications of the particular period in which they were celebrated are not discussed.

<sup>5</sup> See W. Ramsay, "Triumphus", in *A Dictionary of Greek and Latin Antiquities*. W. Smith (ed.), London 1875, 1163–1167 and Beard (n. 2) 63. Unfortunately, there are very few extant descriptions of naval triumphal ceremonies. Duilius' *elogium* is badly fragmented (*ILS* 65) and even its authenticity has been questioned (see below). In the triumph of L. Aemilius Regillus in 189 a modest quantity of golden crowns and money were displayed: Livy 37.58.4–5. The triumph of Octavius in 167 is said to have displayed neither prisoners nor spoils: Livy 45.42.2–3.

<sup>6</sup> Pol. 1.20.

scholarship.<sup>7</sup> Steinby, for example, has recently argued that there was significant Roman naval activity as early as the fifth century BCE.<sup>8</sup>

The chapter in which Polybius describes the construction of Rome's first genuine war fleet in 260 contains a number of important caveats. Although he claims that the Romans built ships for the first time,<sup>9</sup> he also asserts that their shipwrights were inexperienced in the construction of quinqueremes.<sup>10</sup> This statement potentially indicates that Polybius was aware that the Romans had already built and operated ships. Certainly, the Republic had owned ships since the capture of part of Antium's fleet in 338, whilst the *duumviral* fleet had existed since 311. Thus, Polybius might have been distinguishing between, on the one hand, the possession and construction of ships, the Romans having possessed ships for the better part of a century, and, on the other hand, the large-scale construction of a war fleet for offensive purposes, for which there was no Roman precedent.<sup>11</sup>

Although there are sporadic indications of limited Roman naval activity prior to the First Punic War, some of these reports unfortunately are unreliable. Livy, for example, asserts that one of his sources claimed that there had been a naval engagement during the capture of Fidenae in 426. Steinby on this account emphatically states that "the Roman navy participated in the siege of Fidenae", yet then concludes that the incident was suggestive of the possibility of a naval engagement.<sup>12</sup> These observations disregard Livy's preceding note that the victory at Fidenae was actually won on the banks of the river.<sup>13</sup> Livy himself also deemed the suggestion of a naval engagement inexplicable because of the width of the river.<sup>14</sup> Ogilvie and others have plausibly explained the passage as the product of Livy misunderstanding the antique use of the word *classis*.<sup>15</sup> Indeed, other events in the period further confirm that Roman naval capability was very modest around 400. In 394, as Roman envoys attempted to carry a golden bowl to Delphi, the lone ship was captured by pirates and taken to the Lipari Islands. There the local king offered to escort the Roman vessel to Delphi and then back to Rome.<sup>16</sup> In other words, the Romans had failed even to pass through the straits of Messina unmolested.

In 338, with the conclusion of the Latin War, the city of Antium was prohibited from the further use of warships.<sup>17</sup> There is no indication whatsoever in either Livy or the *Fasti* that Antium had been defeated in a naval engagement, despite the fact that the city was an established naval power.<sup>18</sup> The consuls of 338, L. Furius Camillus and C. Maenius, both received triumphs for their defeat of the Latins and Volscians: Camillus over the communities of Pedum and Tibur, and Maenius for Antium, Lanuvium and Velitrae.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> J. H. Thiel, *Studies on the History of Roman Sea Power in Republican Times*, Amsterdam 1946, and *A History of Roman Sea Power before the Second Punic War*, Amsterdam 1954. There have been numerous works that have been far less critical. For instance, L. Achillea Stella, *Italia Antica sul Mare*, Milano 1930 looked at the period prior to the First Punic War. It was criticised in a review by W. W. Tarn, *JRS* 21 (1931) 296f. for its numerous errors and startling omissions; such as no discussion of the destruction of Antium's war fleet.

<sup>8</sup> Steinby (n. 4) 29–86.

<sup>9</sup> Pol. 1.20.9.

<sup>10</sup> Pol. 1.20.10.

<sup>11</sup> A. Goldsworthy, *The Punic Wars*, Cornwall 2000, 96, "there had been little need for warships of any size during Rome's steady conquest of Italy". C. J. Dart, *The Duumviri Nauales and the Navy of the Roman Republic*, in press in *Latomus*, argues that the *duumviri nauales* were primarily employed in the construction and refit of state-owned naval vessels and suggests that their activities as commanders at sea were limited to a support role of the annual magistrates.

<sup>12</sup> Steinby (n. 4) 44f.

<sup>13</sup> Livy 4.33.

<sup>14</sup> Livy 4.34.

<sup>15</sup> R. Ogilvie, *Commentary on Livy Books 1–5*, Oxford 1965, 588f.

<sup>16</sup> Livy 5.28.

<sup>17</sup> Livy 8.14.8. Livy writes that *naues inde longae abactae interdictumque mari Antiati populo est*.

<sup>18</sup> Livy 8.13. Thiel (n. 7) 8 argues that the Rostra was a monument commemorating the defeat of a naval power by a land power. Steinby (n. 4) 55f. attempts to mount the contrary argument that it may be suggestive of a naval engagement.

<sup>19</sup> Livy 8.13.9 and A. Degraffi, *Inscr. It.* 13, 1, 68f. and 541.

Nothing suggests that either consul received these honours, either in part or in full, because of military action at sea.

The preserved treaties with Carthage also suggest that the Romans at the time were principally concerned with protecting their position as Latium's hegemonic power. There reportedly were four treaties, three of which are cited by Polybius.<sup>20</sup> According to Polybius, the first treaty dated to the year of the first consuls, although it almost certainly is a matter of later realities being projected back into the late sixth century.<sup>21</sup> The second treaty (dated to 348) shows that Rome's interests were still primarily confined to Latium.<sup>22</sup> The limited extent of Roman influence is confirmed by the terms of the treaty which even contained a clause allowing for the possibility that the Carthaginians might conquer a city within Latium.<sup>23</sup> It is, however, Polybius' third treaty which most clearly records that as late as 279 the Romans had no significant naval capacity. Polybius asserts that the terms of the previous treaty were reasserted with an additional clause of mutual protection against Pyrrhus of Epirus, and that, irrespective of which party was in need of assistance, the Carthaginians should provide both transports and warships. No such requirement was placed on the Romans.<sup>24</sup> This is a clear indication that while Rome was now a recognised power in Italy, providing naval assistance to the Carthaginians would have been impossible for the Romans.

This picture is further corroborated by Rome's treaty with Tarentum in which the Romans accepted restrictions on where they could sail in southern Italy and also by the pattern of Roman colonial activities. This again indicates that the Romans were still primarily concerned with securing their position within Italy. The establishment of maritime colonies in the late fourth and third centuries served principally to secure Roman control of the coast so as to protect Rome's interior sphere of power.<sup>25</sup> Indeed, C. G. Starr argued that the Roman Republic primarily employed "passive defence" of its coast.<sup>26</sup> Similarly, while the office of the *duumviri navales* is first recorded in 311, the rarity of this magistracy and the apparently limited nature of its powers is a further example of the modest designs of Roman naval endeavours prior to the First Punic War.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>20</sup> Livy says nothing of a treaty in 509 BCE. Livy reports a treaty in 348 BCE (Livy 7.27), a Carthaginian embassy in 343 (Livy 7.38) and a "third renewal" of the treaty in 308 (Livy 9.43.26). Diodorus Siculus gives the years 348 BCE (Diod. 16.69) and 279 BCE (Diod. 22.7).

<sup>21</sup> Pol. 3.22.1. Polybius asserts that the consuls named in the treaty were Brutus and Horatius. According to Livy 2.8.5, however, these men were not consuls simultaneously, whereas modern scholars mostly suggest that all five supposed consuls of 509/8 BCE are mythic figures: see T. R. S. Broughton, *The Magistrates of the Roman Republic*, Vol. 1, Cleveland 1951 [= *MRR* 1], 1–3; F. W. Walbank, *Commentary on Polybius*, Volume 1, Oxford 1957, 339 and G. Forsythe, *A Critical History of Early Rome*, Berkeley 2006, 78–124.

<sup>22</sup> See, for example, T. Frank, Mercantilism and Rome's Foreign Policy, in *AHR* 19 (1913) 233–252. Frank dates the second treaty to 348 and asserts that the treaty was "drawn up by Carthage, an old trading state, to her own advantage and accepted by the then insignificant Roman state" (p. 234).

<sup>23</sup> Pol. 3.24.5.

<sup>24</sup> Thiel (n. 7) 13f., 48f. and 63, interprets all the treaties as indications of Rome's weak naval position. R. Mitchell, Roman-Carthaginian Treaties: 306 and 279/8 B.C., in *Historia* 20 (1971) 633–655 argues that the treaties of 306 and 279 indicate "the growth of Roman strength" and that the treaties are evidence of "the growth of Carthaginian suspicion concerning the speed and direction of Roman expansion" (p. 634). While this may well be a correct assessment it does not mean that the treaties can be used as evidence of increased Roman naval power.

<sup>25</sup> W. E. Heitland, *The Roman Republic*, Cambridge 1911, 107f.; C. G. Starr, Coastal Defense in the Roman World, in *AJP* 64.1 (1943) 56–70; Thiel (n. 7) 11f. and E. T. Salmon, *Roman Colonization under the Republic*, London 1970, 70f.

<sup>26</sup> On the basis that maritime settlements were typically small and possessed Roman citizenship, Starr (n. 25) 59 argues that "one may deduce both the importance of the colonies in Roman eyes and at the same time the limited extent of their functions".

<sup>27</sup> See Th. Mommsen, *Römisches Staatsrecht*, Vol. 2, Leipzig 1887<sup>3</sup>, 579–581; Thiel (n. 7) 7–10 and Steinby (n. 4) 60–63, Dart (n. 11).

## 3. The epigraphically attested naval triumphs

The extant *Fasti Triumphales* record a grand total of eleven (pro-)magistrates as having received the distinct honour of a triumph for combat at sea. The most recent reconstruction is produced by Tanja Itgenshorst<sup>28</sup>:

- 260: *C. Duilius M. f. M. n. co(n)s(ul) primus naualem de Sicul(eis) et classe Poenica egit k. interkal. an. CDXCIII*
- 257: *C. Atilius M. f. M. n. Regulus co(n)s(ul) de Poeneis naualem egit VIII [---] an. [CDXVI]*
- 256: *L. Manlius A. f. P. n. Vulso Long(us) co(n)s(ul) de Poeneis naualem egit VIII[---] an. [CDXCVII]*
- 254: *Ser. Fulvius M. f. M. n. Paetinus Nobilior pro co(n)s(ule) de Cossurensibus et Poeneis naualem egit XIII k. Febr. a. CDX[CIX]*
- 254: *M. Aemilius M. f. L. n. Paullus pro co(n)s(ule) de Cossurensibus et Poeneis naualem egit XII k. Febr. an. CDXCIX*
- 241: *C. Lutatius C. f. C. n. Catulus pro co(n)s(ule) de Poeneis ex Sicilia nauale(m) egit IIII nonas Octobr. a. DXII*
- 241: *Q. Valerius Q. f. P. n. Falto pro pr(aetore) ex Sicilia naualem egit prid. non. Oct. a. DXII*
- 228: *Cn. Fulvius Cn. f. Cn. n. Centumalus pro co(n)s(ule) ex Illurieis naualem egit X. k. Quint. a. DXXV*
- 189: *[L. Aemilius M. f. – n. Regillus pro] praet(ore) ex Asia de [reg(e) Antiocho naualem] egit k. Febr. [an. DLXIV]*
- 188: *[Q.] Fabius Q. f. Q. n. Labe[o pr(aetor) ex] Asia de rege Antioch[o naualem egit n]on. Febr. [an. DLXV]*
- 167: *[Cn. Oc]tavius Cn. f. Cn. n. pro pr(aetore) [ex] Macedon(ia) et rege Perse naualem egit k. Dec. an. DXXCV[II]*

All these triumphs occurred between the beginning of the First Punic War and the final defeat of King Perseus of Macedon by Aemilius Paullus. This remarkable concentration of major naval operations between 260 and 167 thus perfectly coincides with the transformative century when Rome reduced or destroyed all its major rivals in the Mediterranean.

The sources are very clear that 260 indeed occasioned the first time when the triumph was awarded to a Roman magistrate for a naval victory. According to Livy's summary, *C. Duilius consul aduersus classem Poenorum prospere pugnauit, primusque omnium Romanorum ducum naualis uictoriae duxit triumphum*.<sup>29</sup> In Polybius' account, Duilius had actually been assigned command of the land army, while his colleague, Cn. Cornelius Scipio Asina, had taken command of the fleet.<sup>30</sup> Scipio made an early departure for Sicily with seventeen ships and was to be followed by the newly constructed fleet once it was ready.<sup>31</sup> Zonaras, however, has the commands reversed and claims that Duilius was held back in Italy because the fleet was not ready.<sup>32</sup> Since Scipio was taken captive by the Carthaginians shortly after his arrival in Sicily, Duilius placed the military tribunes in charge of the land army and, taking the fleet, won a startling victory off the north coast of Sicily near Mylae. He then went on to rescue Segesta and take the city of Macela.<sup>33</sup> In what was the first serious Roman naval action of the First Punic War,<sup>34</sup> Duilius not only captured thirty-one

<sup>28</sup> Itgenshorst (n. 2).

<sup>29</sup> Livy *Per.* 17.

<sup>30</sup> Pol. 1.21.3–4.

<sup>31</sup> Pol. 1.21.4.

<sup>32</sup> Zon. 8.10.

<sup>33</sup> Pol. 1.22–24 and Zon. 8.10–11. J. F. Lazenby, *The First Punic War*, London 1996, 67f. suggests that these operations preceded the naval victory.

<sup>34</sup> Steinby (n. 4) 29 asserts that “the Romans already had an efficient and powerful navy in the centuries preceding the First Punic War”. In reference to this period Steinby attempts to undermine the conservative assessment of Thiel on the basis that his analysis was heavily dependant on literary sources and did not use archaeological evidence (p. 30) but then concludes that “there is no archaeological evidence about war ships from this period” (p. 31).

and sank thirteen of the enemy ships but also took many spoils.<sup>35</sup> As this historic victory at sea clearly met with all contemporary criteria for a public triumph, the Senate duly decided to award the commander who had achieved this the signal and unprecedented privilege of a naval triumph. Although Duilius' victory in the wake of the great disaster at the Lipari Islands rightly earned him an additional series of extraordinary honours,<sup>36</sup> his triumph in 260 indicates a major innovation in Roman warfare rather than the creation of a new (sub-)category of triumph.

In 257, while anchored off Tyndaris, the consul C. Atilius Regulus made an impromptu attack upon the Carthaginian fleet. Despite initial losses he captured ten ships with their crews and sank eight.<sup>37</sup> This seemingly modest victory occasioned the second naval triumph: *C. Atilius M. f. M. n. Regulus co(n)s(ul) de Poeneis naualem egit VIII [---] an. [CDXVI]*. With over two hundred men per ship, enemy losses may, however, still have numbered several thousand. More importantly Regulus clearly had strong influence with both Senate and People: in the following year he was chosen suffect consul after the death of the consul Q. Caedius.<sup>38</sup> In 256, L. Manlius Vulso Longus (*cos.* 256) and Regulus (*cos. suff.* 256) soundly defeated a Carthaginian fleet off the coast of Sicily, sinking more than thirty and capturing sixty-four enemy vessels.<sup>39</sup> Manlius returned to Italy and duly celebrated a naval triumph. Had Regulus' daring invasion of Africa succeeded he presumably would have claimed a second naval triumph for this victory also. After some initial successes against the Carthaginians in Africa, Regulus became unduly confident and his campaign ended in utter disaster. In 255 the consuls Ser. Fulvius Nobilior and M. Aemilius Paullus were sent to rescue the survivors of Regulus' army from Africa. They managed to defeat a Punic fleet off Cape Bon and captured one hundred and fourteen ships with their crews.<sup>40</sup> Both celebrated naval triumphs in January of 254.

The *Fasti* further record that in 241 both the proconsul C. Lutatius Catulus (*cos.* 242) and the praetor Q. Valerius Falto (*pr.* 242) celebrated naval triumphs because of the same decisive victory of 10 March 241 at the Aegates Islands, with Catulus having his triumph *de Poeneis ex Sicilia* on the 4<sup>th</sup> of October, and Falto his merely *ex Sicilia* on the 6<sup>th</sup> of October. In 242, the pontifex maximus L. Caecilius Metellus (*cos.* 251, *II* 247) had succeeded in keeping the consul A. Postumius Albinus in Rome on the grounds that the latter's office of *flamen Martialis* obliged him to remain in Rome to perform his sacred functions.<sup>41</sup> Instead, the Senate assigned the pursuit of the war in Sicily to both his colleague Lutatius Catulus and the praetor Valerius Falto.<sup>42</sup> In a famous engagement at the Aegates Islands the Romans inflicted a crushing defeat on the Carthaginian navy, sinking fifty warships and capturing another seventy complete with crews, reportedly resulting in some 10,000 prisoners of war, an achievement most worthy of triumphal honours.<sup>43</sup> According to Polybius, Catulus had received command of the fleet in the summer of 242 BCE and then

<sup>35</sup> Zon. 8.11 and *ILS* 65. W. W. Tarn, *The Fleets of the First Punic War*, in *JHS* 27 (1907) 50f. argued that the Roman and Carthaginian fleets were considerably smaller than the numbers provided by Polybius and that the account of an engagement (Pol. 1.21) shortly before Mylae is in fact a Carthaginian version of the same battle recorded in Pol. 1.22. In general, Tarn (p. 48–60) argues that the numbers for Roman and Carthaginian ships during the war are greatly inflated. In particular, if numbers for the battles of Mylae and Ecnomus are indeed inflated, reduced estimates would bring these engagements into a more consistent context with other, seemingly smaller battles, which justified a naval triumph.

<sup>36</sup> The unprecedented nature of Duilius' achievement is clear from the detailed account of the victory which was erected in the Forum (*ILS* 65) and also from the life-long privilege extended to him of being accompanied by flute players and torch bearers at night (Cic. *Sen.* 13 (44), Livy *Per.* 17, Val. Max. 3.6.4, Flor. 1.18 and Sil. It. *Pun.* 6.663–669).

<sup>37</sup> Pol. 1.25.

<sup>38</sup> Broughton *MRR* 1, 208–209.

<sup>39</sup> Pol. 1.28.

<sup>40</sup> Pol. 1.36.

<sup>41</sup> Livy *Per.* 19. F. Münzer, *Römische Adelsparteien und Adelsfamilien*, Stuttgart 1920, 261, suggests that Metellus held back the patrician Albinus in a deliberate move to hand the naval command to the plebeian Catulus: "Indem L. Metellus 242 im zweiten Jahre seines Oberpontificats den patricischen Consul A. Postumius Albinus als Flamen des Mars in Rom festhielt, wandte er dem plebeischen C. Lutatius Catulus, dem ersten dieses Geschlechts, die Ehre zu, die neu geschaffene römische Flotte nach Sicilien zu führen und mit dem lange vorbereiteten entscheidenden Schlage den Krieg um die Insel zu beenden."

<sup>42</sup> T. C. Brennan, *The Praetorship in the Roman Republic*, Oxford 2000, 83.

<sup>43</sup> Pol. 1.61.5–8.

personally defeated Hanno's fleet.<sup>44</sup> In reality, however, the consul had been wounded at Drepanum and had to be looked after by some soldiers, whereas it was Falto who went on to destroy the Punic fleet, after which the consul promptly dictated peace terms to the beaten Carthaginians.<sup>45</sup>

In 2.8.2, in the context of his much discussed chapter *De iure triumphi*, Valerius Maximus records a most interesting dispute between Catulus and Falto concerning the right to triumph on account of their jointly won victory. After summarizing a couple of statute laws dealing with the material requirements candidates had to meet, Valerius recounts that Falto boldly challenged the Senate's decision to decree a triumph to Catulus only and wanted it decreed to himself also. As Catulus insisted that it would be improper to grant the same honour to men holding *impar potestas*, Valerius challenged Lutatius with a *sponsio*, 'if the Punic fleet had not been destroyed under his own leadership'. After both parties had agreed to appoint A. Atilius Calatinus (*cos.* 258, *pr.* 257, *cos. II* 254) as judge, this *éminence grise* quickly passed judgment in favour of Catulus on the indisputable grounds that he as consul had held the superior *imperium* and the prevailing auspices in the hour victory.<sup>46</sup> Since the dispute between the proconsul and the propraetor essentially revolved around (the relative hierarchy of) *imperium* and *auspicium* in *prouvinciae permixtae*, identical provinces<sup>47</sup>, and as Valerius Falto had to concede that Lutatius Catulus had been superior in both respects, Calatinus' verdict should come as no surprise.<sup>48</sup>

Valerius Maximus' account need not be at odds with the tradition of the *Fasti Triumphales*. Valerius simply confined himself to the first and most important stage of the evaluation of the triumphal petitions of 241. After Calatinus had put Lutatius Catulus in the right, the Senate eventually came to a gallant compromise, possibly with the approval of both protagonists, by which the proconsul was given the right to enter Rome in triumph first and the propraetor could next celebrate his own triumph.<sup>49</sup> In this way the Senate subscribed to the proconsul's viewpoint that sharing his triumph with a propraetor would diminish his consular *imperium auspiciumque* and slight the dignity of the supreme commander, whereas the legitimacy of the propraetor's claim to triumphal honours was equally acknowledged. The point of Valerius Maximus 2.8.2 is not that the praetor was not qualified to petition for a full triumph, as his request met with all formal conditions. The message is that the consul, whose *imperium* was *maius* with respect to the praetor's, could lay the highest claim on triumphal honours as the undisputed holder of the *summum imperium auspiciumque*, the supreme command and the prevailing auspices. That the *Fasti* record Catulus triumphing *de Poenis ex Sicilia*, whilst Falto subsequently triumphed only *ex Sicilia*, further reflects the fact that

<sup>44</sup> Pol. 1.59.8–9 and 1.61.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. Broughton *MRR* 1, 218 with Zon. 8.17, where Zonaras indicates that the consul was wounded badly enough to require raising the siege of Drepanum. The victory at the Aegates Islands triggered the Carthaginian capitulation and the end of the war: Pol. 1.60–62.

<sup>46</sup> As Brennan (n. 42) 84 points out that Calatinus then was "the only man alive" who "could claim to have celebrated a triumph as praetor – albeit for successes gained in a consulship", this twofold *consularis* was well-placed to pass authoritative judgement on the issue. See Degrassi, *Inscr. It.* 13, 1, 76f. and 548 and Broughton *MRR* 1, 208 for the fact that on 17 January 257 Atilius Calatinus had celebrated a triumph as *pr(aetor) ex Sicilia de Poenis*. Brennan (n. 42) 80–83 cogently demonstrates the historicity of this triumph.

<sup>47</sup> In *prouvinciae permixtae*, the provincial command was shared by two or more imperators, either on a footing of equality or *impari imperio*. See Livy 27.35.10 for the use of this term to define geographically and functionally identical *prouvinciae* held by two (or more) imperators. For the fact that the same *prouvincia* could be simultaneously *consularis* and *praetoria* if assigned to both a consul and a praetor, see A. Giovannini, *Consulare imperium*, Basel 1983, 68–72 and 109.

<sup>48</sup> In terms of augural law, consuls and praetors indeed held the same type and *potestas* of *auspicia patriciorum maxima* because they were chosen under the same (type of consular) auspices, even though the *consulare imperium* was *maius* with respect to the *praetorium imperium*: see M. Valerius Messalla in Gell. 13.15.4 and 6f., Livy 7.1.6 and 8.32.3, and especially Cic. *Att.* 9.9.3. In the *domi* sphere (and thus normally pre-eminently in Rome) this equality in terms of *potestas auspiciorum patriciorum maxima* meant that the praetors were perfectly entitled to vitiate and hinder the consuls' auspices and vice versa. In the *militiae* sphere however, the superiority of the consular *imperium* also resulted in the superiority of the consular auspices.

<sup>49</sup> Itgenshorst (n. 2) 184 and 186, n. 92 is right to suggest (implicitly) that this case, too, must have been debated in the Senate, as "Die livianischen Triumphdebatten finden dagegen sämtlich im Senat statt", and that this *exemplum* serves to legitimate the imperial monopoly of full triumphal honours, firmly established by the time of his writing.



the consul held the overall command in the war against the Carthaginians. This subtle though important distinction may therefore well trace back to the Senate's eventual compromise.<sup>50</sup>

The period between the First and Second Punic War witnessed only one naval triumph. In 229, both consuls were assigned to Illyria. L. Postumius Albinus commanded the landed army and Cn. Fulvius Centumalus the fleet. The two consuls successfully achieved the subjugation of most of Illyria.<sup>51</sup> The *Fasti*, however, only record Fulvius as having celebrated a naval triumph as proconsul *ex Illurieis* on the 21<sup>st</sup> of June 228. If Polybius' statements about the Illyrian navy are accurate it was of considerable size in 229 BCE. In 233/2, Argon, the Illyrian king, reportedly possessed at least a hundred warships.<sup>52</sup> Upon his death he was succeeded by his wife, Teuta. In 231, Polybius describes her as in possession of a fleet of equal size. As a consequence of the murder of a Roman ambassador in 230, at the outset of 229 Teuta fitted out a larger fleet than in the previous year. These ships sailed to the island of Corcyra where they took the city and then proceeded to besiege Epidamnus.<sup>53</sup> In 229 Fulvius departed Rome with two hundred ships under his command.<sup>54</sup> This force ousted the Illyrian garrison on Corcyra and the two consuls subsequently united their armies at Apollonia. Fulvius now sailed for Epidamnus, prompting the Illyrian fleet to flee. Then, while Postumius moved inland, Fulvius took several Illyrian cities by assault and captured twenty enemy ships.<sup>55</sup> During the capture of Nutria he suffered heavy losses, including the death of some military tribunes and a quaestor. That only Fulvius was permitted to celebrate a triumph and this exclusively over the Illyrian navy, can easily be explained. Many of the cities taken in 229 were held by Illyrian garrisons who quickly surrendered and entered into agreements of friendship with the Romans.<sup>56</sup> Since the enemy consequently suffered relatively few losses in terrestrial engagements, these achievements did not, therefore, warrant a triumph by traditional standards. While the fate of Teuta's navy is not fully explained, Polybius' statement that the queen escaped with only a few of her followers to Rhizon strongly suggests that her impressive fleet was mostly lost to the actions of the other Roman consul.

Although the *Fasti* are entirely reconstructed for the years 222 to 197, other sources do not suggest any naval triumphs having been awarded during the Second Punic War. The next historically attested naval triumph was celebrated in 189 and is one of the best documented instances. In 191, the praetor C. Livius Salinator prepared thirty ships and crossed into Asia with a total fleet of fifty. He received six ships from the Carthaginians and also took command of an additional twenty-five from A. Atilius Serranus (*pr.* 192).<sup>57</sup> M. Iunius Brutus (*pr. urbanus* and *peregrinus* 191) oversaw the refitting and equipping of old vessels currently kept in naval yards and enrolled freedmen as naval allies.<sup>58</sup> In 190, L. Aemilius Regillus (*pr.*

<sup>50</sup> Valerius Maximus' statement that Falto's claim was *non legitimum* is therefore only correct to the extent that the propraetor wrongly felt that he was entitled to be treated on a footing of equality with his supreme commander. This also explains that, although Valerius Maximus highly praises Calatinus' quick decision and Lutatius Catulus' consistent emphasis on the supremacy of the consular *imperium auspiciumque*, he still feels that the propraetor's triumphal ambition was not undeserved. For a full discussion of this historic incident and its tremendous implications for (our understanding of) the history of the triumph under the Roman Republic, see Chapter 5 (The *summum imperium auspiciumque* and the so-called *ius triumphi*) of F. J. Vervaeke, *The Roman High Command. The Principle of the summum imperium auspiciumque under the Roman Republic* (forthcoming).

<sup>51</sup> Broughton *MRR* 1, 228f.

<sup>52</sup> Pol. 2.3.

<sup>53</sup> Pol. 2.9–10.

<sup>54</sup> Pol. 2.11.1.

<sup>55</sup> Pol. 2.11.13–14.

<sup>56</sup> Pol. 2.11.

<sup>57</sup> Livy 36.2.14–15 and 36.41–42. On numbers and Livius' defeat of Antiochus' fleet, see Livy 36.41–45. Despite having captured thirteen and sunk ten enemy ships to the loss of a single Carthaginian vessel, Livius did not receive a triumph. On additional operations in the winter of 191/0, see Livy 37.8–13. On further operations as a propraetor in Lycia in 190 and his failure to report to Aemilius before departing for Italy, see Livy 37.16–17.

<sup>58</sup> Livy 36.2.15. This process of the urban and/or peregrine praetor/s overseeing the refit or construction of ships, quite common in the 190s and 180s, further corroborates that *duumviri navales* were only sporadically appointed, of limited significance and not used for major military actions: see Dart (n. 11).

190) received command of the fleet, taking over some twenty ships and an unspecified number of allies from Brutus. He raised an additional thousand naval allies and two thousand marines.<sup>59</sup> He next sailed for Piraeus and then Samos, where he also took over command of Livius' fleet.<sup>60</sup> Following a number of apparently aimless actions based out of Samos, Aemilius subsequently moved the fleet to Teos.<sup>61</sup> At Myonnesus, he then destroyed half of the fleet of the Seleucid king Antiochus III, burning or sinking twenty-nine and capturing thirteen while only sustaining damage to a few Roman ships and the loss of a single Rhodian ally.<sup>62</sup> Aemilius made an offering at Delos and returned with the Scipio brothers to Italy in 189.<sup>63</sup> Livy provides a short description of deliberations and then the triumph itself.<sup>64</sup> After Regillus had made his case in the temple of Apollo outside the City, a vast majority of senators voted for a naval triumph, *auditis rebus gestis eius, quantis cum classibus hostium dimicasset, quot inde naues demersisset aut cepisset*.<sup>65</sup> Apart from implying that victorious commanders at sea had to meet the same basic set of customary criteria as for any triumphal application, it also suggests that the naval triumph was an especially distinguished kind of triumph acknowledging the extraordinary nature of major seaborne victory. Livy also records that forty-nine golden crowns, 34,200 Attic four-drachma coins and 132,300 *cistophori* were displayed in the celebration but remains silent on whether ships' prows or other equipment were carried in the triumphal pageant.<sup>66</sup> Furthermore, it is unlikely that such equipment would have been a regular feature of naval triumphs: first, ships sunk would have taken much of their equipment to the bottom of the sea with them and second, with the war still ongoing, ships that were captured by the Romans were refitted and pressed back into service rather than being destroyed for public display.<sup>67</sup> In 179 the censor M. Aemilius Lepidus (*cos* 187, *II* 175) dedicated a temple in the Campus Martius to the *Lares permarini*. This temple had been vowed by Regillus in 190 and carried an inscription above the doorway. Importantly, this inscription also set out traditional qualities typically expected for the celebration of a triumph.<sup>68</sup> The inscription stated that Regillus' victory had been achieved *auspicio imperio felicitate ductuque eius inter Ephesum Samum Chiumque*, that Antiochus' fleet was routed, broken and put to flight, and that forty-two ships had been captured along with their crews.<sup>69</sup>

Regrettably, there is relatively little detail preserved about the last two naval triumphs. Q. Fabius Labeo was praetor in 189 and succeeded Aemilius Regillus as commander of the fleet.<sup>70</sup> According to Livy (himself citing Valerius Antias), Fabius had received a naval triumph for the seemingly modest achievement of having compelled the Cretans to liberate four thousand Roman and Italian prisoners.<sup>71</sup> Indeed, his other actions while in command of the fleet were unimpressive. In 188, after the conclusion of the treaty of Apamea with Antiochus and the cessation of hostilities, Fabius, now *propraetor*, was ordered to destroy

<sup>59</sup> In 190 the praetor urbanus, L. Aurunculeius, was instructed by the Senate to construct an additional thirty quinqueremes and twenty triremes (Livy 37.4.5).

<sup>60</sup> Livy 37.2.10–11 and 37.14.

<sup>61</sup> Livy 37.27.

<sup>62</sup> The battle is recorded in Livy 37.28–32. On the losses see App. *Syr.* 27 and Livy 37.30.7. In quoting the victory inscription set up in 179 BCE, Livy gives forty-two as the number of enemy ships captured (Livy 40.52).

<sup>63</sup> *ILS* 8765. The three are recorded as having been together at Aptara in Crete in 190/89 BCE, see M. Tod, Greek Inscriptions, in *G&R* 1.3 (1932) 163–165.

<sup>64</sup> Livy 37.58.3–5.

<sup>65</sup> Livy 37.58.3.

<sup>66</sup> Livy 37.58.4–5.

<sup>67</sup> *Contra* Pelikan Pittenger (n. 2) 293, who sees two early examples as suggestive of a consistent practice: “The Rostra that stood in the Forum for centuries after the regular triumph of consul C. Maenius in 338 (8.14.12) and the *columna rostrata* set up in strategic spots after the first official naval triumph by the consul C. Duillius in 260 suggest that the beaks of captured enemy ships may have played a prominent role as trophies of conquest at sea.”

<sup>68</sup> Livy 40.52.

<sup>69</sup> Livy 40.52.5–6.

<sup>70</sup> Broughton *MRR* 1, 361.

<sup>71</sup> Livy 37.60.

Antiochus' ships. He sailed from Ephesus to Patara and duly dismantled or burned fifty fully-decked vessels.<sup>72</sup> Just as Regillus had done before him in 190, he made an offering at Delos.<sup>73</sup> Fabius recovered Telmessus, rallied the fleet and returned it in its entirety to Italy. The influence or political connections of those Romans and Italians liberated from Crete may account for what appears to be an otherwise unjustified celebration. If so, this example is further evidence of the extent to which the Roman triumph was subject to political influence and canvassing.

The last of the epigraphically recorded naval triumphs was celebrated by the propraetor Cn. Octavius (*pr.* 168) in 167.<sup>74</sup> In 168, as the war against Perseus of Macedon had been assigned to the consul L. Aemilius Paullus, Cn. Octavius as praetor received command of a fleet and closely cooperated with Paullus' army in Macedonia. At the beginning of the campaign in 168 Octavius was at Oreus, with Perseus reportedly fearful of the threat posed by the Roman fleet.<sup>75</sup> Livy expressly records that the consul ordered Octavius to sail for Heracleum and acquire cooked rations for 1,000 men for 10 days.<sup>76</sup> Octavius subsequently captured and plundered Meliboea and then secured the surrender of Perseus at Samothrace, after which he brought the hapless king to Paullus.<sup>77</sup> All the evidence thus suggests that the praetor served under the supreme command and auspices of the consul.<sup>78</sup> Very much on the model of the precedent set in 241, the Senate in 167 authorized Octavius to celebrate a naval triumph on 1 December, the very day after his supreme commander Paullus had celebrated his magnificent triumph over Macedonia and king Perseus from 27 to 29 November.<sup>79</sup> Octavius' naval triumph apparently was something of a low-key side-show as Livy notes that it *sine captivis fuit, sine spoliis*.<sup>80</sup> It is impossible to discern whether this was because Paullus, in addition to taking most of the credit, had also seized most of the spoils for his victory or because there had not really been any single and decisive naval engagement in the war with Perseus.

Last but not least, it is important to point out that the naval triumph only differed from traditional triumphs in that the pageant was probably characterized by the artistic representation of naval warfare, perhaps some maritime spoils, and that its award ensued from major victories at sea. When the Senate in 260 decided to award the first of a number of triumphs officially defined as naval, this certainly did not involve the creation of a new ritual, complete with the definition of a novel set of criteria governing the allocation of such an honour.<sup>81</sup> As with any public triumph, the Senate's decision making process continued to revolve around the material prerequisites (magnitude and nature of the victory, decisiveness, etc.) and the official status of the victorious commander.<sup>82</sup> In fact, there were only two qualifications that were never abandoned

<sup>72</sup> Livy 38.39.2–3 and Pol. 21.43.

<sup>73</sup> *ILS* 8765.

<sup>74</sup> Livy 45.42.2–3.

<sup>75</sup> Livy 44.30 and 33.

<sup>76</sup> Livy 44.35.13: *His ducibus usus praetorem Octavium accersitum, exposito quid pararet Heracleum cum classe petere iubet et mille hominibus decem dierum cocta cibaria habere.*

<sup>77</sup> Livy 44.46.3 and 45.5–6. See also: Broughton *MRR* 1, 427f. for a brief discussion of the commands of Paullus and Octavius.

<sup>78</sup> As is rightly argued by J. S. Richardson, *The Triumph, the Praetors and the Senate in the Early Second Century B.C.*, in *JRS* 65 (1975) 56.

<sup>79</sup> For the magnitude and splendour of Paullus' Macedonian triumph, which spanned several days, see Livy 45.28–40 and Plut. *Aem.* 32–34.

<sup>80</sup> Livy 45.42.

<sup>81</sup> *Contra* Pelikan Pittenger (n. 2) 293f., who seems to distinguish the naval triumph from "the regular triumph". Although she admits that Livy's description of the debates and the celebrations themselves indicate that "the *triumphus naualis* would appear functionally equivalent to a full triumph, more or less", she nonetheless suggests that the naval triumph was "perhaps a fraction lower in rank as a subsidiary rite".

<sup>82</sup> In the sixth chapter of her recent monograph on the triumph (n. 2, 187–218), Beard demolishes most of Mommsen's systematisation of the triumph and the official prerequisites for its award, although her own analysis suffers from excessive scepticism. The suggestion that all attempts to look for a system or patterns governing allocations of triumphs, even those which allow for a fair amount of flexibility, evolution and innovation, are nothing but "scholarly edifice" (p. 208) is overly reductionist. At any given time in the history of the Republic, there certainly existed a set of largely customary rules and regulations. What

before the end of the Republic and the coming of monarchy. The customary law that no commander whose military command had not sprung from the dictatorship, the consulship or the praetorship should celebrate a regular public triumph was first abandoned on behalf of Cn. Pompeius Magnus in 80 BCE.<sup>83</sup> The most fundamental prerequisite – that only holders of lawful and independent *imperium auspiciumque*, imperators in the broadest sense of the word, could lay a legitimate claim to imperatorial salutations, supplications and public triumphs – was never subverted under the Republic.<sup>84</sup> This means that if a Roman commander victorious at sea met both these essential preconditions to petition for the award of a public triumph, the only remaining obstacle was to secure the approval of the Senate and the lack of any obstruction from the tribunes of the *plebs*.<sup>85</sup>

#### 4. Epilogue: three unnamed naval triumphs.

Although the extant *Fasti* record no further triumphs officially defined as naval, there are three particularly prominent examples of triumphal celebrations being staged for military achievements which had involved major victories at sea: Pompeius' exuberant third triumph of September 61, which included his victory over Mediterranean piracy; Octavianus' ovation of 13 November 36, following Agrippa's decisive victory over Sextus Pompeius off cape Naulochus; and, last but not least, his so-called Actian triumph of 14 August 29. As all three of these victories were major naval operations, a brief discussion is not out of place in this inquiry on the role of the naval triumph in Roman history.<sup>86</sup>

In regard to Pompeius' third triumph in September 61, the *Fasti* record that: [*Cn. Pompeius Cn. f. Sex. n. Magnus III.] pro co(n)s(ule), [ex Asia, Ponto, Armenia, Paphla]gonia, Cappadocia, [Cilicia, Syria, Scythais, Iudaeis, Alb]ania, pirateis [per biduum III, pridie k. O]cto. a. DCXCII.* The feature of interest to this inquiry is the conspicuous inclusion of Pompeius' victory over piracy at the very tail end of a long list of victories won on land throughout much of the Near East. Most fortunately, Pliny the Elder records that the announcement of Pompeius' third triumph did indeed give pride of place to his sweeping victory over piracy:

*cum oram maritimam praedonibus liberasset et imperium maris populo Romano restituisset ex Asia Ponto Armenia Paphlagonia Cappadocia Cilicia Syria Scythis Iudaeis Albanis Hiberia Insula Creta Basternis et super haec de rege Mithridate atque Tigrae triumphavit.*<sup>87</sup>

On the one hand, Pompeius artfully avoided listing the pirates as one of the series of adversaries over whom he was technically authorized to celebrate his third triumph by the Senate. On the other hand, the very fact that his comprehensive victory over piracy across the Mediterranean ranked first in his official *prae-fatio triumphi* speaks volumes about his pretensions and how he wished the Romans to remember these

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makes any attempt at reconstructing this framework exceedingly difficult is that some were altered or abandoned as conditions changed; that it was always at the discretion of Senate and People to confirm or drop certain qualifications; and that successful political scheming could lead to precedents or rules being forgotten, invented, adjusted or discarded.

<sup>83</sup> Plut. *Pomp.* 14.1f.; compare also Livy 28.38.4f, Livy 31.20.2–7 and Val. Max. 2.8.5.

<sup>84</sup> The only three exceptions to this rule occurred in 46 BCE, when Caesar as dictator allowed two of his legates to celebrate regular triumphs (Dio 43.42.1f. and compare Caes. *B. Hisp.* 2.2), and again in 47 CE as Claudius honoured A. Plautius, one of his propraetorian legates, with an ovation for his role in the invasion of Britain (Suet. *Claud.* 24.6, Tac. *Ann.* 13.32 and Eutropius 7.13). For a full discussion of these aspects of Roman (customary) public law, see Vervaet (n. 50).

<sup>85</sup> Given the nobility's relentless internal competition, senatorial votes on individual petitions for triumphs regularly turned into lengthy debates. Officially, these contentious arguments revolved around the validity of the claim, the circumstances of the moment, as well as a series of customary criteria and precedents. In reality, however, the personal charisma of the Imperator and his political clout as well as the positions and personalities of the senior senators present were often decisive, see Itgenshorst (n. 2) 148–179 and Pelikan Pittenger (n. 2).

<sup>86</sup> For an excellent discussion of the historic significance of Pompeius' third triumph, see Beard (n. 2) 7–41. For a recent analysis of the critical importance of the Actian triumph in the Augustan historical narrative, see C. Lange, *Res Publica Constituta. Actium, Apollo and the Accomplishment of the Triumviral Assignment*, Leiden–Boston 2009.

<sup>87</sup> Pliny *N.H.* 7.98.

achievements. Indeed, by putting the pirates first and subsequently completing the list with Mithridates and Tigranes themselves, Pompeius publicly put his naval victory over the pirates on a par with those over two of the Near East's most illustrious kings. In the same context, Pliny further records that a temple Pompeius dedicated to Minerva out of the proceeds of the spoils of his Asian campaign carried an inscription that also prominently paraded his naval successes against piracy in the Mediterranean:

*Cn. Pompeius magnus Imperator bello XXX annorum confecto fuis fugatis occisis in deditionem acceptis hominum centiens uiciens semel LXXXIII depressis aut captis nauibus DCCCXLVI oppidis castellis MDXXXVIII in fidem receptis terris a Maeotis ad rubrum mare subactis uotum merito Mineruae.*<sup>88</sup>

It should, therefore, come as no surprise that in the Augustan canonisation of the *Fasti Triumphales* Pompeius' victory over piracy, too, came to be included in the series of lands and adversaries over which he had officially triumphed in September 61, albeit this time at the very end of the list of conquered entities.<sup>89</sup>

Pompeius' own crafty representation of his victories in September 61 and beyond does, however, indicate a certain degree of hesitation about the official inclusion of pirates in a triumphal role of honour. This can be explained by the fact that triumphal customary law determined that victories over lowly and undignified adversaries such as slaves and pirates could at best occasion the award of an ovation, as such debased military success was deemed unworthy of full public triumphs.<sup>90</sup> In 71 not even M. Licinius Crassus (*cos.* 70, *II* 55) had dared to break this rule, although he and Pompeius had flatly refused to disband their legions and ruthlessly pressured the Senate into decreeing whatever inordinate honours they desired on account of their respective services to the Republic. Although Crassus had disdainfully rejected the myrtle crown, customary for ovations, and had the Senate pass a decree that he should instead be crowned with laurel, the traditional decoration for the full public triumph, he had still contented himself with an ovation for his victory in the Servile War.<sup>91</sup>

Pompeius' deliberate representation of his victory over the Mediterranean pirates as a kind of unnamed naval triumph no doubt further antagonised his enemies and critics in the Senate. As Plutarch explains in *Luc.* 35.7, the Senate, and the *nobiles* in particular, already felt aggrieved about Lucullus' succession by Pompeius in 66. They considered the former a wronged man because they believed that he had been superseded in a triumph, not in a war, and that he had been forced to relinquish and turn over to others the prizes of victory in his campaign, and not his campaign itself. As such, Pompeius' hubristic subversions of the boundaries of triumphal customary law probably earned him further stinging criticism. An echo of these hostile reactions to Pompeius' brazen acts of self-aggrandisement may be found in Valerius Maximus 2.8.5:

“Indeed the law of which I speak was so well guarded that no triumph was decreed to P. Scipio for the recovery of the Spains or to M. Marcellus for the capture of Syracuse because they had been sent

<sup>88</sup> Pliny *N.H.* 7.97: “Cn. Pompeius Magnus, Imperator, having completed a thirty years' war, routed, scattered, slain or received the surrender of 12,183,000 people, sunk or taken 846 ships, received the capitulation of 1,538 towns and forts, subdued the lands from the Maeotians to the Red Sea, duly dedicates his offering vowed to Minerva.”

<sup>89</sup> For an echo of the order of appearance in the Augustan *Fasti*, see Val. Max. 8.15.8: *de Mithridate et Tigrae, de multis praeterea regibus plurimisque ciuitatibus et gentibus et praedonibus unum duxit triumphum.*

<sup>90</sup> Gell. 5.6.21: *Ouandi ac non triumphandi causa est, cum aut bella non rite indicta neque cum iusto hoste gesta sunt, aut hostium nomen humile et non idoneum est, ut seruorum piratarumque, aut, deditione repente facta, ‘inpuluerea’, ut dici solet, incruentaque uictoria obuenerit.* Compare also Flor. 2.19.

<sup>91</sup> Gell. 5.6.23: *Ac murteam coronam M. Crassus, cum bello fugitiuorum confecto ouans rediret, insolenter aspernatus est senatusque consultum faciendum per gratiam curauit, ut lauro, non murto, coronaretur.* Pliny's record of the event implies that the distinction was the single exception to the rule (Pliny *N.H.* 15.125). Plut. *Crass.* 11.8 records that “Crassus, for all his self-approval, did not venture to ask for the major triumph, and it was thought ignoble and mean in him to celebrate even the minor triumph on foot, called the ovation, for a servile war”, he had at least retained some scruples about customary procedures and traditional propriety. For the mostly ignored or overlooked fact that in 71, both Pompeius and Crassus used their legions in blatant violation of the *lex Cornelia maiestatis* to force the Senate to grant a series of exemptions from other Cornelian legislation, see F. J. Vervaet, Pompeius' Career from 79 to 70 BCE: Constitutional, Political and Historical Considerations, in *Klio* 91 (2009) 423–430.

to conduct these operations without any magistracy. Now let approval be given to glory hunters (any glory) who have plucked with hurrying hand sprigs of laurel destitute of renown from desert mountains and the beaks of pirate galleys: Spain torn from Carthage's empire and Syracuse, the head of Sicily, cut off could not yoke triumphal cars. And for what men! Scipio and Marcellus, whose very names are like an everlasting triumph. But though the Senate would fain have seen them crowned, the most illustrious representations of true, sterling virtue, bearing their country's welfare on their shoulders, it thought they should be reserved for a more legitimate laurel."<sup>92</sup>

It is hard not to construe these words as a thinly veiled and crushing verdict on Cn. Pompeius, contrasting his triumph over brigands and pirates to the achievements of P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus (*cos.* 205, II 194) and M. Claudius Marcellus (*cos.* 222, 215, 214, 210, 208), who were both denied triumphs because they had failed to meet certain contemporary criteria.<sup>93</sup>

Agrippa's victory over Sextus Pompeius at Naulochus was a major naval engagement by any standard and duly earned him the unprecedented honour of a *corona naualis*.<sup>94</sup> Nonetheless, Octavianus, Agrippa's commander-in-chief as the triumvir *r.p.c.* charged with the war against Sextus, could hardly have asked the Senate to award him with a full-fledged naval triumph.<sup>95</sup> First and foremost, this victory had been won in a civil war over fellow Romans. After the battle of Munda, Caesar had notoriously shocked public opinion in Rome by celebrating the first triumph ever over Roman citizens as *dictator IIII* in October 45.<sup>96</sup> Second, Octavianus' triumphant return from Sicily in November 36 was carefully staged as a defining turning point in his public policy. Appian relates that, after *SPQR* had showered him with extraordinary honours, he made speeches to both Senate and People recounting his exploits and, in a move to legitimize his acts so far, his policy from the beginning to the present time.<sup>97</sup> In these speeches, Octavianus solemnly proclaimed peace and good-will, said that the civil wars were over, remitted the unpaid taxes, and magnanimously released the farmers of the revenue and the holders of public leases from what they owed. Amongst the honours he accepted was a golden image to be placed on a column in the Forum, bearing the powerful inscription: τὴν εἰρήνην ἐστασιασμένην ἐκ πολλοῦ συνέστησε κατὰ τε γῆν καὶ θάλασσαν.<sup>98</sup> After taking resolute action to restore runaway slaves all across his power sphere and extirpate banditry in Italy, he reportedly took another series of sensational actions, as Appian records in *B.C.* 5.132 that:

<sup>92</sup> For this as well as the previous translation from Valerius Maximus we have used Shackleton Bailey's excellent edition in the *LCL* series (Harvard University Press 2000), modified where necessary.

<sup>93</sup> Valerius is confused as concerns Metellus in that he received an extraordinary proconsulship in 215 BCE (Livy 23.30.19 and Broughton *MRR* 1, 255), whereas he was *consul III* in 214 and subsequently conquered Syracuse in 212, after his *imperium* had been prorogued *in annum* in 213 and 212 (Broughton *MRR* 1, 264 and 268f.). As Livy records in 26.21.1–4, the Senate in 211 refused to grant Metellus a public triumph on the grounds that he had not returned his army to Rome, even though he had left it in his province by decree of the Senate.

<sup>94</sup> The sources invariably credit Agrippa for the victory; see, e.g., Vell. Pat. 2.81.3, Dio 49.14.3 and Livy *Per.* 129. Livy, Velleius and Dio emphasize that the honour of a naval crown was unique. Pliny *N.H.* 7.115 and 16.7 does, however, record that Cn. Pompeius in 67 extended a similar honour to M. Terentius Varro, viz. the *corona rostrata*.

<sup>95</sup> See Lange (n. 86) 33f.

<sup>96</sup> Dio 43.42. See Dio 43.19.2 for the fact that Caesar had already offended people in Rome in 46 in his African triumph by parading the lictors and the other triumphal spoils taken from slain citizens.

<sup>97</sup> App. *B.C.* 5.130. Dio 49.15.3 clarifies that Octavianus made these speeches "according to ancient custom outside the *pomerium*". Compare also F. Millar, *The First Revolution: Emperor Caesar, 36–28 BC*, in *La révolution romaine après Ronald Syme. Bilans et perspectives*, F. Paschoud, A. Giovannini and B. Grange (eds.), Genève 2000, 7–8, who argues that "At the level of political structures and political ideology, it could be suggested that the evolution towards the 'Augustan principate' took place in three stages. The first was the period from Emperor Caesar's return from Naulochus in the Autumn of 36 BC to his departure for the campaign of Actium. These years saw, in Rome, the co-existence of an individual ruler, 'Imperator Caesar Divi filius', with Senate and People. It was symbolic of that co-existence that his first step on return was to make a speech reporting on the military situation to the People meeting outside the *pomerium*."

<sup>98</sup> App. *B.C.* 5.130: "Peace, long disrupted by civil war, he restored on land and sea." For the honours voted immediately upon the news of Octavianus' victory, see also Dio 49.15.1–2. Amongst the honours Octavianus also accepted were the ovation that had been decreed to him and a perpetual supplication (dinner) in the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus on the anniversary of the day on which he had won his victory over Sextus Pompeius.

“He allowed the annual magistrates to administer public affairs in many respects in accordance with ancestral custom. He burned the writings which contained evidence concerning the civil strife, and said that he would restore the polity entirely when Antonius should return from the Parthian war, for he was persuaded that he, too, would be willing to lay down his office, the civil wars being at an end.”

In other words, the civil wars being officially over, he would now consistently position himself as the foremost custodian of Rome’s traditional social and political order.<sup>99</sup> As recorded in the *Fasti*, he therefore duly had the Senate decree him the privilege to celebrate an ovation “over Sicily” instead: *Imp. Caesar Diui f. C. f. II, IIIuir r(ei) p(ublicae) c(onstituendae) II, ouans ex Sicilia idibus Nouembr. a. DCCXVII*. By virtue of this show of ostentatious modesty Octavianus’ cleverly avoided a repeat of Caesar’s offensive transgression of October 45. This move furthermore allowed the dictator’s political heir to kill two birds with one stone. Indeed, by accepting the honour of what was also known as the lesser or minor triumph for his hard-won victory over Sextus, he also implicitly and yet emphatically cast the latter in the role of a pirate, an enemy *humilis et non idoneus*.<sup>100</sup> This posthumous degradation of Sextus Pompeius and his cause also features prominently in the *Res Gestae*, where Pompeius’ son is implicitly labelled a pirate, and his lot thrown in with that of hoards of rebelling slaves:

*Mare pacuui a praedonib[us]. Eo bello seruorum, qui fugerant a dominis suis et arma contra rem publicam ceperant, triginta fere millia capta dominis ad supplicium sumendum tradidi.*<sup>101</sup>

In *Res Gestae* 27.3 then Augustus rather spitefully hammers home this message:

*Prouincias omnis, quae trans Hadrianum mare uergunt ad Orien[te]m, Cyrenasque, iam ex parte magna regibus eas possidentibus, et antea Siliciam et Sardiniam occupatas bello seruili reciperauui.*<sup>102</sup>

Finally, there is Octavianus’ second triumph celebrated on 14 August 29.<sup>103</sup> According to Degrassi’s reconstruction of the *Fasti*, Octavianus celebrated it as *Imp. Caesar Diui f. C. n. IV, consul V, ex Actio XIX k. Sept.*<sup>104</sup> However, as numerous sources indicate, Actium was in every respect celebrated as a naval victory. Contemporary coinage prominently displays Victory holding a laurel wreath atop the prow of a ship. Octavianus’ memorial for the battle at Nicopolis was a major naval monument, displaying across its façade ships’ rams, naval trophies and an inscription that proudly advertised a major victory at sea.<sup>105</sup> Cassius Dio, too, unambiguously attests that Octavianus’ second triumph was for his naval victory at Actium, Ἀκτίῳ ναυκρατία.<sup>106</sup> Dio also records that after his arrival in Rome, he bestowed the customary eulogies

<sup>99</sup> For a full discussion of these events and their historical significance, see F. J. Vervaet, The Secret History: The Official Position of Emperor Caesar Divi filius from 31 to 27 BCE, in *Ancient Society* 40 (2010) 79–152.

<sup>100</sup> For the ovation being also styled the minor triumph, see Plut. *Marc.* 22; Dion. Hal. 5.47.2–4 and 8.67.10; and Pliny *N.H.* 15.19 (*minoribus triumphis ouantes*). That the ovation nonetheless was a sort of triumph is also clear from, e.g., Pliny *N.H.* 15.125 and *Res Gestae* 4.1.

<sup>101</sup> *Res Gestae* 25.1.

<sup>102</sup> For an outstanding discussion of both passages and how contemporary sources faithfully echo the grossly distorted representation of the war against Sextus and his confederates as a ‘pirate’ and a ‘slave’ war, see R. T. Ridley, *The Emperor’s Retrospect: Augustus’ Res Gestae in Epigraphy, Historiography and Commentary*, Leuven 2003, 183–187. The argument in this paper further substantiates Ridley’s incisive comments on this issue. For the *Res Gestae*, we have used the excellent new edition by J. Scheid, (Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 2007).

<sup>103</sup> See Lange (n. 86) 148–156.

<sup>104</sup> Degrassi, *Inscr. It.* 13.1, 570. Strangely enough, the *Fasti Barberiniani* only mention his preceding and subsequent triumphs *de Dalma[t]is* and *ex A[egy]pto*, according to Mommsen because of oversight on the part of the composer.

<sup>105</sup> See W. M. Murray and P. M. Petsas, *Octavian’s Campsite Memorial for the Actian War*, Philadelphia 1989 and K. Zachos, The *tropaeum* of the sea-battle of Actium at Nikopolis: interim report, in *JRA* 16.1 (2003) 64–92. There have been several reconstructions of the commemorative inscription, which likely dates to 29 BCE – compare discussion in Murray and Petsas 76; Zachos 72–77; and Lange (n. 86) 109–111.

<sup>106</sup> Dio 51.21.7. Dio provides no detail of the actual celebration on the second day, save that spoils acquired in the conquest of Egypt were used for all three days.

and honours upon his subordinate commanders, whereas Agrippa among other distinctions also received a dark blue flag in honour of his naval victory: καὶ τὸν τε Ἀγρίππαν ἄλλοις τέ τισι καὶ σημεῖω κυανοειδεῖ ναυκρατητικῷ προσεπεσέμνυνε.<sup>107</sup> This extraordinary acknowledgement of his instrumental role in the victory at Actium possibly was a substitute for the celebration of a naval triumph by Agrippa himself on the model of, for example, Valerius Falto in 241 and Cn. Octavius in 167.<sup>108</sup> Although unlike Falto and Octavius, Agrippa most probably did not possess *imperium auspiciumque* of his own at Actium in 31 and as such did not qualify in terms of his official status,<sup>109</sup> it is highly improbable that he would have accepted a naval triumph for a victory his master so emphatically claimed as his most defining ever.<sup>110</sup> For reasons of appearance, Octavianus clearly could not share the glory of what his regime claimed to have been the single great act of ending the civil wars.<sup>111</sup>

In the light of these considerations, it is quite likely that the *Fasti* proudly recorded Augustus' second triumph as *ex Actio naualis*, or perhaps a little more emphatically, *naualis ex Actio*. There would have been several advantages to commemorating Actium as the twelfth and final naval triumph. First, this would have allowed Emperor Caesar Divi filius to give his triumphal record a distinctly unique appearance. Second, a magnificent naval triumph would have been a perfect means to eclipse Pompeius Magnus' resounding triumph over piracy.<sup>112</sup> Finally, it would have been an original way both to revive and conclude a glorious republican tradition, established some 230 years ago on behalf of C. Duilius, and to herald in a golden new age of peace and prosperity.<sup>113</sup>

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<sup>107</sup> Dio 51.21.3.

<sup>108</sup> The substitute of *ornamenta triumphalia* would not be introduced before 14 BCE, when the same Agrippa was the first to receive this honour: see Dio 54.24.7f. For an interesting study on the connection between imperatorial salutations and the (award of) *ornamenta triumphalia*, see W. Eck, Kaiserliche Imperatorenakklamation und ornamenta triumphalia, in *ZPE* 124 (1999) 223–227.

<sup>109</sup> Agrippa was consul in 37 and aedile in 33 (Dio 49.43). Though in supreme command of Octavianus' navy, Agrippa's position in 31 is uncertain, see F. Hurlet, *Les Collègues du Prince sous Auguste et Tibère*, Rome 1997, 552. Broughton *MRR* 2, Cleveland 1952, 422–423 suggests that Agrippa was simply a “promagistrate” in 32 and 31. Agrippa possibly was a consular *legatus* or, perhaps, a *praefectus classis* and therefore not traditionally entitled to a triumph anyway.

<sup>110</sup> For the fact that Agrippa on no less than three occasions turned down public triumphs voted on his behalf by the Senate for political reasons, see Dio 48.49.3f. (37 BCE, comp. App. *B.C.* 5.92); 54.11.6 (19 BCE); and, last but not least, 54.24.7f. (14 BCE). For a good discussion of the historic significance of Agrippa's refusals of triumphs in 19 and 14 BCE, see W. Eck, Senatorial Self-Representation: Developments in the Augustan Period, in F. Millar and E. Segal (eds.), *Caesar Augustus. Seven Aspects*, Oxford 1984, 139.

<sup>111</sup> The rhetorical significance that Actium would acquire is further reflected in *Res Gestae* 25.3, where Augustus asserts that *iuravit in mea uerba tota Italia sponte sua mea et me belli, quo uici ad Actium, duces deposcit*.

<sup>112</sup> This suggestion may, perhaps, also explain why, in striking contrast to Pompeius' own commemorative strategy, the Augustan *Fasti* listed the pirates last in the series of entities conquered by Pompeius in the period 67–63. Indeed, as the Augustan *Fasti* seem to list Pompeius' successes in terms of their relative importance and prestige, the subtle message perhaps was that his much advertised victory over piracy was the least, or the least honourable, of his achievements.

<sup>113</sup> For illuminating surveys of his distinctive policy to revive or reinstate traditional institutions and practices, see, e.g., J. Bleicken, *Augustus: eine Biographie*. Berlin 1998, 297–390; W. Eck, *The Age of Augustus. Translated by Deborah Lucas Schneider, New Material by Sarolta A. Takács*, Malden, MA 2003, 41f.; and, especially, J. Scheid, Augustus and Roman Religion: Continuity, Conservatism, and Innovation, in K. Galinski (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to the Age of Augustus*, Cambridge 2005, 178–186.